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Fast moving consumer goods (FMCGs) constitute a large part of consumers’ budget in all 
countries. The retail sector for FMCGs in Turkey is in the process of a drastic 
transformation. New, “modern” retail formats, like chain stores and hyper/supermarkets, 
have rapidly diffused in almost all major urban areas, and increased their market share at 
the expense of traditional formats (grocery shops, green groceries, etc.) in the last couple 
of decades. This rapid transformation has raised concerns about competitive conditions in 
the sector. This study is aimed at to shed light on competitive conditions prevailing in the 
FMCGs retail trade sector in Turkey.  We analyze how the structure of the market is being 
transformed in recent years by new retail formats. The study is focused on the analysis of 
competitive dynamics (inter-firm rivalry, pricing and non-price policies, barriers to entry, 
regulatory conditions, etc.) within the sector, and draws lessons for competition policy. 
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1. Introduction 
Fast moving consumer goods (FMCGs) constitute a large part of consumers’ budget in all 
countries. Retail trade in these products, that is, their supply to households, has attracted 
considerable interest from consumers and policy-makers because a well-functioning retail 
sector is essential for daily provision of these essential products at high quality and low 
cost. 
 
The retail sector for FMCGs in Turkey is in the process of a drastic transformation. New, 
“modern” retail formats, like chain stores and hyper/supermarkets, have rapidly diffused in 
almost all major urban areas, and increased their market share at the expense of traditional 
formats (grocery shops, green groceries, etc.) in the last couple of decades. This rapid 
transformation has raised concerns about competitive conditions in the sector.
1  
 
This study is aimed at to shed light on competitive conditions prevailing in the FMCGs 
retail trade sector in Turkey.  We analyze how the structure of the market is being 
transformed in recent years by new retail formats. The study is focused on the analysis of 
competitive dynamics (inter-firm rivalry, pricing and non-price policies, barriers to entry, 
regulatory conditions, etc.) within the sector, and draws lessons for competition policy. 
Since the FMCG retail sector is closely related to suppliers (FMCG producing industries), 
other services (most importantly, wholesale trade), and users of FMCGs (hotels and 
restaurants), the backward and forward industry linkages are also taken into account. 
 
The study is based on four sources of information. First, we extensively use official 
statistics collected by the State Institute of Statistics (SIS). Although the SIS provides 
comprehensive data on the retail trade sector and supplier industries (number of firms, 
employees, production, foreign trade, etc.), the data are not up-to-date (most of the data are 
not available beyond 2002). Second, we conducted a series of interviews with the main 
observers and actors both in the private (FMCGS retailers as well as suppliers) and public 
sectors. Interviews provided very valuable information on various business practices and 
                                                 
1 Competitive conditions in the retail trade for fast moving consumer goods received considerable interest in 
many developed countries as well. As a result of concern s raised by the public and consumer organizations, 
competition authorities in developed countries conducted specific studies on competitive conditions and anti-
competitive practices in this sector. One the most comprehensive studies was conducted for the UK 
Competition Commission (2000).  For competition issues in the retail sector, see Mazzarotto (2001) and 
Dobson et al. (2001).  
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competitive dynamics in the sector. Third, we conducted a comprehensive survey, partly to 
get quantitative evidence on the issues raised by the interviewees. A list of 100 main 
retailers and about 200 suppliers was collected. Two questionnaires, one for retailers and 
the other one for suppliers, were prepared and the survey was conducted in the fourth 
quarter of 2004. The response rate was about 50 percent for retailers and 40 percent for 
suppliers. Finally, we used the HTP Household Consumption Panel data to analyze market 
share dynamics and pricing behavior.  
 
The study is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data on the structure of the 
FMCG retail market. Sector 3 summarizes recent changes in the markets (market 
dynamics). Section 4, drawing on the survey and HTP data, describes the conduct of 
retailers and suppliers, and analyzes the implications for competitive conditions. Section 5 
discusses likely changes that can be observed in the future. After a brief discussion on 




2. The market 
 
The retail market for fast moving consumer goods (FMCGs) consists of various retail 
channels. The International Standard Industry Classification (ISIC, Revision 3) classifies 
retail channels into seven categories at the 4-digit level: ISIC 5211 retail sale in non-
specialized stores, ISIC 5219 other retail sale in non-specialized stores (department stores, 
etc), ISIC 5220 retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in specialized stores, ISIC 5231 
retail sale of pharmaceutical and medical goods, cosmetic and toilet articles, ISIC 5251 
retail sale via mail order houses, ISIC 5252 retail sale via stalls and markets, and ISIC 
5259 other non-store retail sale. Since there is no firm in categories ISIC 5251 and 5252 in 
Turkey, they are excluded from our analysis. 
 
Table 1 presents the summary data on the retail sector
2 in Turkey for the period 1997-
2001.
3 The data on wholesale sectors (5121 wholesale trade in agricultural raw materials 
                                                 
2 Unless otherwise stated, since our study is focused on FMCGs, the “retail sector” refers to only those 
sectors that trade FMCGs (ISIC 521 and 522), and excludes other sectors such as retail trade of  
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and live animals, and ISIC 5122 wholesale trade in food, beverages and tobacco) are also 
included in the table.  
 
The retail sector in Turkey sold $ 29.8 billion worth of goods in 1999. Its contribution to 
GDP amounted to $ 6.7 billion.
4 The value of goods sold declined sharply in 2001 (21.9 
billion) because of the severe economic crisis in that year. The Turkish lira depreciated 
almost by 100 percent whereas manufacturing prices increased by 67 percent. The value of 
goods traded by the wholesale industry experienced a similar decline from 1999 ($ 23.1 
billion) to 2001 ($ 19.4 billion). The retail sector employed 231 thousands people, and the 
number of people engaged in the sector (paid workers plus owners, self-employed and 
unpaid family workers) was 580 thousands in 2001. The retail sector, together with the 
wholesale sector, provides employment for 690 thousands people. In other words, it is one 
of the leading employment generation sectors in Turkey. 
 
There were about 282 thousands retail and 20 thousand wholesale establishments in 2001, 
i.e., in an average retail establishment, there are only two people working, whereas an 
average wholesale trader operates with 5.5 people. The sector shrunk more than 10 percent 
in real terms in 2001, but the number of establishments and the number of employees/ 
engaged people increased slightly in the same year, thanks to its flexibility.  
 
The retail sector is closely related with agriculture and FMCG supplying industries.
5 Total 
value added created by the agriculture sector was $ 27.2 billion in 2000 (Table 2). FMCG 
supplier industries added $ 7.2 billion. Agriculture employs almost 35 percent of all 
working people in Turkey (about 7.5 million people). Since a significant part of the 
population lives in rural areas and are engaged in agricultural production, a large part of 
                                                                                                                                                    
pharmaceutical and medical goods, textiles, clothing, footwear,  household appliances, hardware, paint and 
glass (ISIC 523), retail sale of second-hand goods in stores (ISIC 524), retail trade not in stores (mail order 
houses, etc., ISIC 525) and repair of personal and household goods (ISIC 526). 
3 The State Institute of Statistics conducted the Census of Businesses in 2002, but the results were not 
available as of January 2005.  
4 The share of rent expenses and interest payments in total value added was around 4 percent and 1 percent, 
respectively.  
5 The following industries are included in FMCG supplier industries (ISIC Revision 3): 1511 meat and meat 
products, 1512 fish and fish products, 1513 fruit and vegetables, 1514 vegetable and animal oils and fats, 
1520 dairy products, 1531 grain mill products, 1532 starches and starch products, 1533 animal feeds, 1541 
bakery products, 1542 sugar, 1543 cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery, 1544 macaroni, noodles, 
couscous, 1549 other food products, 1551 spirits; ethyl alcohol, 1552 wines, 1553 malt liquors and malt, 
1554 soft drinks, mineral waters, 1600 tobacco products, 2101 pulp, paper and paperboard, 2102 corrugated  
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agricultural goods are consumed there. The FMCG supplying industries employed 203 
thousands people in 2000 (down from 216 thousands in 1998). These industries lost further 
10,000 jobs during the economic crisis in 2001.  
 
The retail sector provides households essential consumption goods. However, these same 
products are consumed by households as services provided by hotels and camping sites 
(ISIC 5510) and restaurants, bars and canteens (ISIC 5520 that also includes catering 
activities and take-out activities). These services purchase FMCGs from wholesale and/or 
retail trade outlets and substitute for consumption at home. These two sectors’ sales for 
private domestic consumption were about $ 5 billion in 1998.
6 Thus, hotels and restaurants 
demand a considerable amount of FMCGs and they provide these goods embodied in their 
services to households as substitutes. Moreover, the share of these sectors in total FMCG 
consumption tends to increase. Total output of hotels and restaurants increased in dollar 
terms 73 percent in only three years, from 1997 to 2000, whereas the sales of the retail 
sector grew 31 percent in the same period.
7  
 
Turkey imported, on average, $ 1.9 billion worth of agricultural products annually in the 
period 1998-2003, and its average annual export revenue from agricultural products was 
about $ 2.4 billion in the same period. It is a net exporter in food products ($ 1.9 billion 
exports vs $ 1.3 billion imports), and a net importer of paper and paper products. It 
exported somewhat more soap and detergents, cleaning preparations, and perfumes than it 
imported in the last 6 years. The most important imported food items are meat and meat 
products and vegetable and animal oils and fats (total import value in 2003 was almost $ 1 
billion).  
 
An analysis of the market structure in supplier industries is necessary to understand the 
performance of the retail sector. The data on concentration rates (4-firm concentration 
ratios,
8 CR4) are shown in Table 3. The 4-firm concentration rates are higher than 50 
percent in fish and fish products (53), dairy products (696), starches and starch products 
                                                                                                                                                    
paper, containers, 2109 other articles of paper and paperboard, 2424 soap and detergents, cleaning 
preparations, perfumes. 
6 It is calculated from the 1998 Input-Output table. 
7 Professional catering services is one of the fastest growing sectors in Turkey. Although there was no 
catering firm among the largest 500 private firms in 2001 (listed by Capital journal), two catering firms, 
Sofra and Sodexho were ranked 290
th and 346
th in 2003.   
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(913), cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery (933), macaroni, noodles and couscous 
(173), spirits and ethyl alcohol (539), wines (31), malt liquors and malt (329), soft drinks 
and mineral waters (763), tobacco and tobacco products (3143), and soap and detergents, 
cleaning preparations and perfumes (1215).
9 In order to determine the degree of 
concentration in domestic supply, we need to check the level of concentration in imports, 
and the share of imports in domestic supply as well. The SIS data on concentration in 
imports show that 4-firm concentration ratio in imports, i.e., the share of 4-largest 
importers in total imports, exceed 50 percent in only macaroni, noodles and couscous, and 
beverages (all four sub-sectors). Since imports make up less than 25 percent of domestic 
supply of all FMCG-related products (with one exception, pulp, paper and paperboard), 
foreign trade does not likely to have a major impact in reducing the market power of 
domestic suppliers.
10 Thus, we conclude that seller power could be a problem for retailers, 
especially for small ones, for the aforementioned products. 
 
The SIS does not calculate concentration rates for retail sectors. However, we have 
collected sales data from major retailers for the period 2000-2003. We have estimated 4-
firm concentration rates for the non-specialized retail trade in stores sector (ISIC 521) by 
assuming that the largest chain stores in our sample do not compete with specialized retail 
sector (ISIC 522 and 523) and non-store retail trade (ISIC 525). Our estimates suggest that 
4-firm concentration rates in the non-specialized retail trade in stores was 10.8 percent in 
2000 and 11.5 percent in 2001.
11 The level of concentration is much lower in Turkey than 
in many European countries, but is expected to increase gradually as a result of the 
increasing market share of and the wave of mergers between large retailers.
12  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
8 Since the SIS collected data at the establishment level, concentration ratios are calculated for 
establishments. The data excludes private establishments employing less than 10 people. 
9 Sales values in 2001 are provided in parentheses to give an idea about the size of the market. 
10 As a result of the customs union with the EU, tariff rates for imports of industrial products from the EU are 
equal to zero percent. Tariff rates for agricultural products are rather high, about 50 percent for live animals 
and animal products, 39 percent for vegetable products and 23 percent for edible oils (trade weighted 
averages for 2003). Tariffs for imports from other countries are slightly higher than those from the EU 
(Togan and Taymaz, 2005). High tariff rates for these products help large domestic suppliers to protect their 
market power.   
11 According to the HTP data, the share of four largest chains (B￿M, Migros, Tansa￿ and Gima) in total 
FMCG sales in 2003 was 8.8 percent.  
12 Among the European countries in the late 1990s, the lowest 5-firm concentration rates for food retailing 
are observed for Italy (30 percent) and Spain (38), whereas the highest rates are observed in Sweden (87 
percent) and Finland (96 percent). The rates for the UK, Germany and France were 67 percent, 75 percent 
and 67 percent, respectively. The level of concentration increased in the 1990s in almost all major European 
markets (Dobson Consulting, 1999: 45).    
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Finally, we will look at the financial performance of the retail sector and FMCG-related 
sectors. Table 4 presents the data on profit margin (operating profits/turnover).
13 As may 
be expected, the profit margin is very low in retail trade (ISIC 521): it was around 1 
percent in 1997 and 1998, but it became negative in 1999 and continues to be negative. 
Retail trade of new goods in specialized stores (retail trade in pharmaceutical and medical 
goods, textiles, clothing, footwear, household appliances, hardware, paint and glass) had a 
much higher profit margin, around 10 percent in the period 1997-2002. Profits margin in 
wholesale trade is somewhat higher than the margin in retail trade (5.8 percent in 
wholesale of agricultural raw materials, and 1.9 percent in wholesale of food, beverages 
and tobacco). Among the FMCG-supplier industries, other chemical products and tobacco 
have the highest profit margins.  
 
Profit rates (profits before tax/equity ratio) are highly correlated with profit margins. Retail 
trade in FMCG experienced a sharp decline in profit rate in 2001 (-43 percent), and 
sustained substantial losses in 2002 as well. However, retail trade in non-FMCG (ISIC 
523) has had quite high profit rates throughout the period under investigation. Wholesale 
trade has a high profit rate (on average, around 25 percent in the period 1998-2002), and 
tobacco and other chemicals are among the most profitable FMCG-supplying industries. 
 
Although there are a few observations, there is a discernible positive correlation between 
profitability measures and 4-firm concentration ratios (average values for 1999-2001). 
Highly concentrated sectors, like tobacco and other chemicals, score well in profitability 
measures. Incidentally, retail trade in FMCG (ISIC 521) has the lowest concentration rate 
and it is one of the least profitable sectors.  
 
 
                                                 
13 The data are collected by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. Unfortunately, there are no data for 
ISIC 522. The main drawback of the CBRT data is its coverage. It includes only those establishments that 
applied for a loan from the banking system. Profit margin can be calculated from the SIS data as well. Profit 
margin as defined by value added minus wage payments (including imputed wages for unpaid family 
workers and self-employed) to sales ratio was around 10-13 percent for the retail sector (ISIC 521) in the 
period 1997-2001.   
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3. Market dynamics 
 
We have seen that the level of concentration in retail trade in FMCG is quite low compared 
to the European countries. However, the concentration data provides a snapshot of the 
sector without much information on the underlying dynamics. Therefore, in this section, 
we will analyze market dynamics, i.e., entry and exit processes with a special emphasis on 
entry by foreign firms, and changes in the composition of the industry by retail type. (The 
process of internationalization of retailers in Turkey is extensively studied by Tokatli and 
her colleagues, see Tokatlı and Boyacı, 1997; Tokatlı and Özcan, 1998; Tokatlı and 
Eldener, 2002.  For a comparison between the retail market in Turkey and other emerging 
markets of Europe, see Tokatli, 1999).  
 
The market dynamics is to a large extent determined by the regulatory framework. The 
Australian Productivity Commission (APC), in collaboration with the Australian National 
University, has measured restrictions on trade in services for a number of countries in the 
world.
14 The OECD has also compiled a large database, the OECD International 
Regulation Database, for various sectors, including wholesale and retail trade (see, for 
example, Boylaud, 2000; Boylaud and Nicoletti, 2001). In this study, we use the APC 
database to compare Turkey with various categories of economies because it covers a large 
number of countries and summarizes regulations in index form. 
 
The trade restrictiveness index is calculated for two types of supply (domestic and foreign) 
and two types of activities (ongoing operations and establishment of new businesses). It 
covers all distribution services, i.e., wholesale and retail trade (ISIC 51 and 52). Table 5 
presents the data on restrictiveness index scores for Turkey and average values for four 
country categories (developed countries, EU-15, Latin America and Asia). The domestic 
index scores for all country groups are quite low. In other words, there are not many 
restrictions on establishment of domestic retail firms and their ongoing operations. The 
domestic index score for restrictions on establishment is zero for Turkey, i.e., Turkey does 
not impose any serious restriction that may impede the establishment of domestic retail 
firms. The domestic index score for restrictions on ongoing operations is slightly higher 
                                                 
14 The database was downloaded in December 2004 from the Australian Productivity Commission website: 
http://www.pc.gov.au/research/rm/servicesrestriction  
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than the average of other countries, mostly because of insufficient protection of intellectual 
property rights (IPRs).  
 
Turkey seems to have minor restrictions on the establishment of foreign retail firms: the 
index score is only 0.031 (much lower than the EU-15 average, 0.153; other developed 
countries, 0.094; Latin American countries, 0.080; Asian countries, 0.176). In other words, 
contrary to other countries, Turkey does not discriminate against foreign firms in the retail 
sector. The index score for restrictions on ongoing operation of foreign firms in Turkey is 
comparable to those observed in other countries (0.096 for Turkey vs 0.086 for EU-15, 
0.071 for other developed countries, 0.074 for Latin America, and 0.105 for Asian 
countries). “Insufficient protection of intellectual property rights” is again the main factor 
contributing to the foreign index in Turkey. Turkey seems to restrict “movement of 
people” that imposes additional restrictions for foreign firms. 
 
Turkey has introduces a number of changes in protecting IPRs in recent years. Turkey 
introduced a number of laws on the protection of patent rights, industrial designs, 
geographical indications, and trademarks, and ratified the Patent Co-operation Treaty, and 
Nice, Vienna and Strasbourg Agreements, and specialized courts on IPRs were established. 
Turkey has become a member of the European Patent Convention in 2000. The new law on 
foreign direct investment (No 4875, enacted on June 5, 2003) guarantees national treatment 
for foreign firms established in Turkey and allows 100 percent foreign ownership in almost 
all sectors.
15 Moreover, the law on work permits for foreign nationals (No 4817, enacted 
on February 27, 2003) has reduced the administrative burden on getting work permit, and 
opened up a large number of occupations to foreign citizens. We can conclude that, with 
the recent legislative changes, Turkey has lifted almost all restrictions in retail sector for 
domestic and foreign investors. 
 
The regulatory framework has changed so as to create an environment favorable to entry of 
new companies, and efficient operation and growth of existing ones. Turkey has a number 
of policy tools to promote investment in various sectors, activities and/or regions. The 
Decree of the Council of Ministers on investment incentives (No 2002/4367, June 10, 
                                                 
15 There are some exceptions defined in sector-specific laws. The exceptions are: (i) broadcasting, where 
foreign shareholders’ equity participation is restricted to 25 percent; and (ii) aviation, maritime  
  9 
2002) provides the legal basis for state support schemes. The Regulation on the 
implementation of the decree (No 2002/1, published in the Official Journal on July 3 
2002), defines the administrative procedures, and clarifies the types of investment 
activities that can benefit from state support. The Regulation (Appendix 6, A.11) explicitly 
states that investment in “hypermarkets, shopping centers and car parks” in any region will 
not benefit from any investment incentive. Although the exclusion of hypermarkets and 
shopping centers from the state support program is potentially an unfavorable amendment 
for large chains companies, they did not raise much concern about it.
16  
 
There is no reliable data on entry and exit in the retail sector. However, since the average 
establishment size is very low (only 2 people per establishment), the turnover rate is 
expected to be high. In spite of high turnover and the economic crisis in 2001, the number 
of establishments in the retail sector has continuously increased since 1997.
17 For example, 
there were 260175 establishments in retail trade
18 in 1997, and it increased to 267370 in 
1998, 273057 in 1999, 279329 in 2000, and 281911 in 2001. The number of establishments 
increased in other retail types and wholesale trade as well. 
 
Although there is a slight increase in the number of retail establishments, the market has 
been transformed by the entry and diffusion of “organized” or “modern” retailing (chain 
stores, hypermarkets and supermarkets). Migros-Turk, established in 1954, was the first 
retail joint-venture between Municipality of Istanbul and the Federation of Swiss 
Cooperatives in Turkey (Tokatlı and Boyacı, 1997: 105). However foreign partner 
withdrew in 1975 and majority shares of the company were transferred to Koç Holding. 
The first supermarket chain in Turkey, Gima, was established in 1956 as a public 
undertaking. It was privatized in 1993, and sold to the partnership of Bilfer and Dedeman. 
The majority shares of the company were later sold to Fiba Holding in 1996 (Tokatlı and 
                                                                                                                                                    
transportation, ports, fish processing and telecommunications services provided under concession 
agreements, where foreign ownership is restricted to 49 percent. 
16 An interviewee claimed that major chain stores have already invested in hypermarkets, and do not plan to 
open many more hypermarkets in the future. Therefore, they were indeed in favor of excluding hypermarkets 
from the coverage of investment incentives scheme because it may restrict entry into this segment of the 
market. In other words, this amendment is favorable for incumbent chain stores. 
17 However, AC Nielsen (2004) estimates that the number of retailers declined continuously from 176 
thousands in 1996 to 143 thousands in 2003. The number of chains, hyper and supermarkets and specialists 
(gas station markets, dry fruit vendors, etc.) increased in the same period. For the survival strategies of small 
retailers, see Özcan (2000). 
18 It includes sectors ISIC (Rev. 2) 5211, 5219, 5220, 5231 and 5259.  
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Özcan, 1998: 92). Another main retailer, Tansa￿, was set up in 1973 by Izmir Municipality. 
It was also privatized in 1996 and Do￿u￿ Holding purchased the majority of its shares.  
 
The 1990s witnessed entry by foreign firms. As the first foreign retailer, Metro 
International entered into market in 1988. (Although Metro adopted the cash-and-carry 
format, it is regarded as a “retail” store serving mostly small scale shops and households.) 
Carrefour and Promodes, French retailers, entered into market in 1991 and 1992, 
respectively (Tokatlı and Boyacı, 1998: 6). Carrefour entered into retailing by establishing 
partnership with Sabancı Holding (CarrefourSa) in 1996. The merger by parent companies 
of Carrefour and Promodes affected the Turkish retail market, and CarrefourSa acquired 
Continent in 2000. After operating ten years in Turkey, Metro planned to set up a joint 
venture with Migros in 1998. Although the Competition Board granted a conditional 
permission, the merger was not realized. Metro established a new retailer, Real, in 1997, 
which was followed by Dia in 1999 and B￿M in 2000. The last major foreign entry 
occurred in 2003. A leading retail chain store in the UK, Tesco, entered into the Turkish 
market in 2003 by merging with Kipa, a regional retailer. The industry analysts suggest 
that new foreign retailers, for example, Wall Mart, are planning to enter into the Turkish 
retailing market.
19   
 
Most of the large domestic chains that entered into the retailing sector in the 1990s, are 
members of business groups that operate in FMCG-supplier industries and service sectors 
(see Table 6). There seems to be a tendency towards both vertical integration and 
horizontal integration. For example, Sabancı and Koç groups are active in supplier 
industries and hotels and restaurants sector. In the retail sector, they have different retail 
formats (hypermarkets, supermarkets and discount stores) operated under different brands 
names. Other retailers also tend to be active in various retail formats and own vertically 
related firms (Özcan, 2001). 
 
                                                 
19 The data on foreign firms in Turkey have been collected by the Undersecretariat of Treasury. Foreign firms 
started to enter in large numbers in the mid-1980s. The number of foreign entrants in FMCG-related sectors 
reached 60 firms per year in the 1993-1997 period. By the end of 2004, there were more than 1000 foreign 
firms operating in FMCG-related sectors, and most of them (more than 80 percent) were majority-owned 
foreign companies. Hotels and restaurants sector are leading in terms of foreign entry, and food and hotels in 
terms of total capital. (The list of all foreign companies can be downloaded from the Treasury web site: 
www.hazine.gov.tr.)  
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As noted earlier, we have conducted a survey of large FMCG retailers and FMCG-
suppliers in Turkey, and received responses from 51 retailers and 79 from suppliers. Table 
7 presents the data on the time of establishment of these companies that can be used as an 
indication of entry into the retail market by large companies. Our survey data show that 
most of the largest retailers operating in 2004 were established in the 1990s. More than 60 
percent of retailers were established in the 1989-1998 period whereas those established 
before 1989 represent only 20 percent of retailers. 13 of 51 retailers who responded to our 
survey belong to a (domestic) business group, and 5 are foreign-firms.
20 Most of 
companies belonging to business groups and multinational companies were also 
established in the 1990s. There is no new large-scale entry since 1998. 
 
The entry pattern of FMCG-suppliers is quite different than the one observed for retailers. 
More than half of suppliers who responded to our survey were established before 1984. 
This is valid for suppliers who belong to business groups as well. The difference in entry 
patterns in retail and supplier sectors indicate that FMCG retail sector, once considered to 
be dominated by traditional retailers, has become quite appealing for large companies, and 
attracted significant amount of large-scale entry in the 1990s. However, the FMCG-
supplying industries seem to be dominated by large, old (established) companies who do 
not face with entry competition, as evident in high concentration rates in most of these 
industries. 
 
The transformation of the retail market brought by entry of large (chain) companies can be 
observed in FMCG purchasing patterns of consumers. We look for purchasing patterns of 
four groups of consumers, categorized by their socio-economic status as AB, C1, C2 and D 
groups,
21 because chain markets operating mainly hypermarkets and large supermarkets 
may incline to serve well-to-do consumers who can afford to travel these stores by their 
own cars.  
 
                                                 
20 Only one foreign firm operating in the retail sector did not respond to our survey. However, it is owned by 
a business group, and its sister retailer company responded to our survey. 
21 We use the HTP Household Consumption Panel data for this purpose. HTP runs the household panel since 
1996 and it currently covers 4,900 households. The panel covered 12 provinces until, and expanded to 27 
provinces in 2002 to represent all Turkey. We use the data on only 12 provinces because chain stores have 
established mainly in large provinces. Since the FMGC market is mainly a local market, it is better to focus 
on main provinces to analyze competition dynamics between retail types. We would like to thank Güntaç 
Özler, Vural Çakır, Kerem So￿ukpınar, Erdem Çi￿dem and  Ay￿e Pancar of HTP and the Retailing Institute 
for their generosity in sharing their data and knowledge with us.  
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Figures 1a-1d depict purchasing patterns of four categories of consumers, respectively. AB 
group consumers used to purchase their FMCGs mostly from traditional grocery shops. 
The share of grocery shops in total FMCG expenditures of the AB group was more than 35 
percent in 1999 but it declined steadily to 22 percent in 2004. The main winners are local 
supermarkets, and DVFV and kiosks, gaining about 6 and 3 percentage points market 
share, respectively, in the last five years. Thus, local supermarkets have been the largest 
retailer for AB group of consumers since 2002. The single most important chain that 
achieved a considerable increase in its market share is B￿M, a hard discount store. Its 
market share for AB group increased from 4 to 12 percent. Migros and ￿ok seem to be the 
losers for the AB group. Their total share declined from 14.2 percent to 8.7 percent in the 
same time period. 
 
Grocery shops have been the main retailer for the C1 group but its share declines 
continuously (from 50 percent in 1999 to 35 percent in 2004). Local supermarkets (from 
24 percent to 31 percent) and B￿M (from 4 percent to 12 percent) are the main winners in 
this market as well.  Migros has not been an important outlet, and its share fluctuated 
around 4 percent. 
 
The C2 group behaves as the C1 group. Grocery shops have a declining share (from 53 
percent to 42 percent), and local supermarkets (from 18 percent to 31 percent) and B￿M 
(from 5 percent to 10 percent) increased their shares.  
 
The D group experienced possibly the most dramatic transformation. Grocery shops had 
the dominant share for this group of consumers in 1999 (about 65 percent), but lost their 
market drastically (48 percent in 2004). Local supermarkets (from 14 percent to 27 
percent), B￿M (from 4 percent to 10 percent) and DFV and kiosks (from 2 percent to 7 
percent) had increased their shares substantially. 
 
Although the trends are similar for four categories of consumers (declining shares of 
grocery shops, increasing shares of local supermarkets, B￿M, and, to some extent, DFV 
and kiosks), the levels of market shares of retail formats are still significantly different 
across consumer groups. For example, the share of traditional outlets (grocery shops and 
open bazaar) was only 22.4 percent for AB group in 2002, it was 35.1 percent for C1 
group, 43 percent for C2 group, and 48.6 percent for D group. In a similar way, chain  
  13 
stores have a larger share in FMCG expenditures of well-to-do consumers. Total share of 
all chains (B￿M, CarrefourSA, Dia, Gima, Kipa-Tesco, Migros, Real, ￿ok and Tansa￿) was 
35.8 percent for AB group and 28.1 percent, 18.9 percent and only 15.3 percent for C1, C2 
and D groups, respectively. However, chain stores excluding B￿M have not been successful 
in increasing their market shares in the last five years. The combined market share of all 
chain stores excluding B￿M increased only a few percentage points for AB and C1 groups, 
and declined almost the same amount for C2 and D groups. These findings indicate that 
large chain stores, as a group, has gained some market share in the early- and mid-1990s, 
especially in those markets serving AB and C1 groups, but their market share has been 
stabilized. However, local supermarkets and B￿M continue to increase their market shares 
at the expense of traditional retail formats. 
 
The informal sector is considered as one of the main obstacles for the development of the 
“modern” retail sector because informal sector firms, by not paying social security 
contributions and any taxes, gain an unfair competitive advantage against firms obeying 
laws and regulations. Although it is almost impossible to measure the exact size of the 
informal sector, its share in the market can be estimated roughly.  
 
According to the SIS 2003 Household Labor Force Survey, there were 4.1 million people 
employed in wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants, and 42 percent of these 
people were not covered by any social security system. Thus, more than 40 percent of the 
people employed in “wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants” are employed 
“informally”.  
 
We have asked in our survey the firms about the extent of the informal sector. Almost 
three quarters of retail and suppliers firms indicated that they compete with the informal 
sector firms. These firms estimated that the market share of the informal sector was around 
30 percent in retail and 20 percent in FMCG supplier sectors. These estimates are 
somewhat lower than the estimates derived from the HLFS
22, but they indicate that 
informal sector continues to play and important role, especially in the retail sector. 
 
                                                 
22 Informal sector firms are usually small firms with low turnover/employee ratio. Therefore, the size of the 
informal sector estimated by survey respondents is consistent with the share of employees without any social 
security as estimated by the Household Labor Force Survey.   
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In spite of the rapid development of the modern retail formats in Turkey in the last 
decade
23, their market share is still very low compared to the European countries. 
According to AC Nielsen data (AC Nielsen, 2004: 20), the markets shares of hypermarkets 
and big supermarkets reached 36.0 percent and 23.3 percent, respectively, in European 
countries in 2002 whereas their total share in Turkey in the same year was only 22 percent 
(11 percent for hypermarkets and 11 percent for big supermarkets). Among the European 
countries, the lowest total share of hypermarkets and big supermarkets was observed in the 
Netherlands (25 percent), Austria (29 percent) and Greece (36 percent), and the highest 
shares in Portugal (62 percent), the UK (76 percent) and France (77 percent). These 
findings indicate that modern retail formats (hypermarkets and big supermarkets) are likely 
to increase their market shares substantially in Turkey.  
  
 
4. Retailers’ conduct 
 
Large chain stores have entered into the FMCG retail sector in Turkey in the early- and 
mid-1990s and have transformed its structure. Although their share in the national market 
is still small, they may have significant market power in localities they operate because the 
FMCG market is basically a local market. There are different definitions for the 
geographical dimension of the market, but it is commonly accepted that a customer is not 
likely to move more than 30 km for shopping. Therefore, large retailers’ conduct should be 
analyzed to shed light on possible abuses of market power. Since retailers sell FMCGs 
without any further processing, we will focus on pricing behavior and supplier-retailer 
relations. 
 
We have conducted interviews with about 20 large retailers, and on the basis of our 
findings, designed two surveys, one for retailers and the other one for FMCG-suppliers to 
get information about retailers’ conduct and retailer-supplier relations. We received 
responses from 51 retailer and 79 from suppliers. The responses rates were 50 percent and 
40 percent, respectively. Table 8 presents the data about the coverage of these surveys. 
According to the SIS statistics, total sales value of the “non-specialized retail trade in 
                                                 
23 High inflation rates in the 1990s were one of the main reasons behind the rapid increase in the market share 
of modern retail formats (hypermarkets and supermarkets) which could make large financial profits due to  
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stores” sector (ISIC 521) was $ 14.3 billion in 2001. Total sales of 44 firms who provided 
the sales data for 2001 for our survey was $ 2.6 billion. In other words, the surveyed firms 
account for at least 18.3 percent of non-specialized retail trade.
24 The SIS data are not 
available for 2003. However, HTP estimates total FMCG retail sales in 2003 as $14.4 
billion. Chains, discounters, hypermarkets and supermarkets sold 4.6 billion worth of 
FMCG in the same year. Thus, according to HTP data, our sample of firms covers 30.3 
percent of total sales and 94.6 percent of sales by chains and supermarkets.
25 These 
comparisons suggest that our sample firms provide a good coverage of large retailers. The 
coverage ratio for FMCG-supplier industries is also quite satisfactory (18.4 percent of sales 
in 2001). The retail firms’ turnover in our sample was around $ 100 million, and they 
employed, on average, about 900 people. Suppliers are slightly smaller ($ 78 million 
turnover and 750 employees per firm in 2001).  
 
In order to compare our results across firm size, we have classified firms into three 
categories, small, medium-sized, and large. Since more retail firms provided their 
employment data, we used the number of employees in 2003 for classification for the retail 
sector (small means employing less than 150 people, medium-sized 150-499 people, and 
large 500 and more people). However, for those firms we have sales data, the 
classifications based on employees and turnover were almost the same. For suppliers firms, 
we used turnover data for 2003 for classification (small means turnover less than $20 
million, medium-sized $ 20-50 million, and large more than $ 50 million). The cut-off 
values are chosen such that firms are more-or-less equally distributed in these three 
categories. 
 
Table 9 shows the distribution of firms across size categories. All five foreign firms in the 
retail sector are large firms. Moreover, all but one firm that belong to business groups are 
medium-sized and large firms. There are 9 foreign firms in our sample of suppliers (11 
percent of all firms). There are two small, one medium-sized and five large foreign 
suppliers. Suppliers belonging to business groups are, on average, large firms. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
their superior financial management skills. We thank our referee for this comment. 
24 Since the surveyed firms are large firms, they account a smaller share of employment.  
25 Some of the surveyed firms sell non-FMCGs as well. Therefore, the coverage rates could be slightly 
overestimated.  
  16 
There is a strong positive correlation between retailer size and store size (see Table 10). 
Small retailers do not own any hypermarket, and concentrate on supermarkets and small 
supermarkets (store area between 100-1000 m
2). A few medium-sized retailers operate 
some hypermarkets, but their preferred type is a supermarket with 400-1000 m
2 store area. 
Almost all hypermarkets are operated by large retailers who have also a large number of 
small supermarkets. Foreign retailers operate either hypermarkets or small supermarkets.  
 
An analysis of large domestic and foreign retailers at the firm reveals clear differences in 
firm strategies. More than 80 percent of small supermarkets of large domestic firms are 
operated by only two firms, whereas there is only one foreign firm that operates small 
supermarkets. In other words, most of large firms, either domestic or foreign, concentrate 
on operating relatively small number of large stores (hypermarkets, large supermarkets, 
etc.) whereas a few large firms have been following the strategy of opening a large number 
of small supermarkets all around the country.  
 
Estimates on total store area indicate that large retailers have a dominant position. 11 large 
domestic retailers had 58 percent of total store area whereas 4 large foreign retailers had 28 
percent in 2003.  
 
The number of products sold by a retailer changes positively by size as well. Small and 
medium-sized retailers sell about 9000 and 12000 products, respectively. Large retailers 
sell a large number of products, about 24000. 
 
The survey questionnaire included questions that define the “relevant market” for retailers. 
Three aspects of the market, consumers’ socio-economic status, retail format, and 
geographical market, are used to define the “relevant market”. There seems to be no 
difference between small and large retailers in terms of serving different categories of 
consumers. Large retailers claim to serve all categories more, but there is not any 
specialization towards serving any specific consumer group. As may be expected, all 
retailers indicate that “supermarkets” constitute the main competitive form. 75 percent of 
large retailers consider hypermarkets as a part of their market. It is interesting to observe 
that discount markets and cash&carry are closely related with large retailers’ markets.  
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Geographical aspect seems to be main aspect that defines the “relevant market” for 
retailers. Almost all small and medium-sized retailers consider their market as local (only 
one province), or regional whereas half of large retailers consider the market as a national 
market. Moreover, the market is conceived as “international” by one third of large retailers 
(5 firms). It is interesting that only one foreign retailer considers its market as 
“international” whereas others (4 firms) consider it as national and/or regional.  
 
Firms were asked to provide data on the number of entrants into and exits from the market 
in which they operate. Most of the firms (60 percent) could not respond to this question. 
The average values for the number of entrants and exits were 3.6 and 2.5 for retailers, and 
12.3 and 12.1 for supplies. Firms estimated their market share in 2003. Interestingly, small 
retailers estimated larger market shares, probably because of the fact that, as note earlier, 
they consider their market local. In the case of FMCG-suppliers, large firms claimed to 
have larger shares, as one would expect, because suppliers’ compete mainly at the national 
level. 
 
FMCG retailers sell (or could sell) almost identical products. Therefore, price-competition 
is likely to be very important. If they have local market power, they would be able to raise 
their prices. Price comparisons could be helpful in identifying if some retailers (mostly, 
chain stores) enjoy a certain degree of market power. However, it is notoriously difficult to 
make a price comparison across retailers and/or retail type because each retailer sells a 
different basket of products and the number of products sold is very large. To mitigate the 
effects of differences in product mix, we calculate relative prices for baskets of products 
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Thus, RP compares the cost of the basket of products purchased from retailer j to the 
amount the consumer would pay for the same basket had s/he bought it at (weighted) 
average of prices observed in the market, i.e., the amount a random buyer would pay. 
 
We calculated relative prices for various retail types and all national chain stores for three 
groups of products, food, personal care products, and cleaning products.
26 Figure 2a 
presents the data on relative food prices for the period 1999:4-2004:3 (we use 4-quarter 
moving averages to mitigate the effects of quarterly fluctuations). The data reveal 
consistent and persistent patterns in relative food prices. For example, B￿M, the hard 
discount store, had the lowest relative food prices throughout the period. A B￿M customer 
paid on average 8 percent less than what s/he would pay at average market prices. Other 
discount stores, Dia and Kipa had also low prices. CarrefourSA, known for its aggressive 
pricing strategies, was among the low cost chains. Gima and Migros had a tendency to 
raise their prices relative to the market, and has become the most expensive chains in 2004 
(the price differentials were 6 percent for Gima, and 3 percent for Migros in 2004). Tansa￿, 
Real and ￿ok chains increased their relative prices especially in the period 2000-2003. It is 
remarkable to find that DFV and kiosk and grocery stores have been 3-4 percent more 
expensive, and local supermarkets 1-2 percent cheaper throughout the period. In other 




The relative price data on personal care products reveals somewhat different trends (Figure 
2b). For these products, B￿M chain and cash&carry and open bazaar formats provide low 
cost alternatives. Real, Gima, Tansa￿ and Migros chains are among the most expensive 
providers of personal care products in recent years. Grocery shops are again relatively 
more expensive (1-2 percent). Local supermarkets were relatively expensive in 1999 and 
2000, but have reduced their relative prices, and get close to the average in 2004. There 
                                                 
26 We use the HTP data in calculating relative prices. The dataset includes price and quantity data for those 
products that were sold by most of the retailers in almost all quarters under investigation (1999:1-2004:3).  
27 A recent study by McKinsey Global Institute (2003) indicates that there are substantial productivity 
differentials between “traditional” (for example, groceries) and “modern” (hypermarkets, supermarkets, etc.) 
retail formats. It is estimated that the “modern” retailers are almost three times more productive than 
“traditional” retailers (“productivity” is measured as value added per hour worked). Similarly, the SIS data 
indicate that “large” retailers are 3-4 times more productive than “small” retailers. Although the productivity 
differential between traditional and modern retailers is huge, the impact of productivity differentials on prices 
is much smaller because the share of wage payments in turnover (sales revenue) is only about 2-5 percent, 
and the share of value added in turnover is about 20 percent in the retail sector. Moreover, the traditional 
retailers reduce their costs to some extent by avoiding tax and social security payments.   
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seems to be an upward trend in almost all relative prices. This is caused by the substantial 
shift towards low-cost retailers.  
 
Cleaning products have a different ranking. Open bazaars experienced a sharp decline in   
relative prices of cleaning products after 2001 crisis. Carrefour and cash&carry were low-
price leaders in 2004. Gima, Migros and Tansa￿, as in the case of other products, were 
relatively more expensive. Prices at local supermarkets, grocery shops and B￿M fluctuated 
around the average values.  
 
There are two conclusions that can be drawn from price comparisons: first, price 
differentials are not trivial. It was about 14-15 percent in all products (food, personal care 
and cleaning products) in 2004. Considering quite thin profit margins in the retail sector, 
these differences seem to be quite significant. Second, consumers are fairly price-sensitive 
in food products:
28 low-price retailers, most importantly, local supermarkets and B￿M have 
increased their market shares (for all consumer categories), whereas grocery shops lost 
substantial market share in the last five years.  
 
Since there are quite significant price differentials between retail types and customers have 
different shopping characteristics that depend on their socio-economic status, prices paid 
by different groups of consumers may differ. This issue is certainly important from welfare 
point of view.  
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There seems to be no difference in relative food prices paid by socio-economic groups. 
The price differential was widened in 2001, after the economic crisis that hit probably 
hardest the D category, but even in that year, the differential remained less than 2 percent. 
Although well-to-do consumers, presumably the AB group, could pay higher prices for 
                                                 
28 The share of food in total FMCG expenditures is about 85 percent.   
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food, and the D group is more sensitive to food prices, they turn out to be paying almost 
the same price because the D group goes to grocery shops for shopping, but as noted 
earlier, grocery shops are relatively expensive.  
 
The behavior of relative prices for personal care and cleaning products is completely 
different. The price differential between socio-economic groups was quite small in 1999 
and 2000 (only a few percentage points), but it widened up rapidly after the 2001 economic 
crisis, and reached almost 15 percent in the case of cleaning products. It is apparent that 
price sensitive poorer consumers (D group) have substituted cheap, no-brand products after 
the economic crisis for more expensive brands (recall the low prices in open bazaars), 
whereas well-to-do consumers (the AB group) could afford more expensive brand-name 
products.  
 
We have established that average prices differ consistently and considerably across retail 
types. However, price differences do not directly imply market power. Since the FMCG 
markets are local, chain stores face with different competitive conditions in different local 
markets. Therefore, those companies that have market power may differentiate their prices 
across local markets. This behavior, called “price flexing”, can be an indicator for the 
exercise of market power.  
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where PFjt is the degree of price flexing by retail j at time t, wijt the share of i
th in total sales 
of retailer j at time t, ￿ijt the coefficient of variation of i
th product prices for retailer j during 
the period t. Thus, the PF variable shows the degree of price dispersion (price 
differentiation) by retail types.  
 
Figure 3a shows the data on price flexing in food products. All retail types experienced the 
same trend: after a slight increase in the degree of price differentiation until the middle of 
2001, there was a sharp decline in the second half of 2001 and throughout 2002. The 
decline in price differentiation continued at a slower pace in 2003 and 2004. Since we 
calculated the PF index by using quarterly observations, any change in prices within the  
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quarter will increase the index value. In other words, the general pattern of changes in the 
PF values follows closely changes in inflation rates. When the rate of inflation is high, 
price changes will be more frequent/ large, leading to a higher PF value. 
 
A closer analysis of PF values reveals that traditional FMCG outlets, open bazaars and 
grocery shops had higher price differentiation than all chain stores. Local supermarkets and 
cash & carry stores had also high price differentiation values. All chain stores had much 
lower values throughout the period. There is not any permanent ranking of chain stores in 
terms of the PF values. Thus, it seems that chain stores have either more stable prices or 
they do not differ much their prices across their shops. Prices differ more across open 
bazaars, grocery shops and local supermarkets. The lowest PF values are found among 
DVFs and kiosks that mainly sell items whose prices are usually set at the national/regional 
level (tobacco products, beverages, etc.).
29 Thus, there is not much scope for price 
differentiation for these shops. 
 
A different pattern emerges in the case of personal care products. Grocery shops, local 
supermarkets and cash & carry stores had higher PF scores for personal care products, but 
some chains, most notably, the market leaders, Migros and ￿ok, had also quite high PF 
values in 2004. There seems to be price flexing in these chain stores as high as the one in 
traditional outlets.  
 
Since there was not sufficient number of observations for a number of chain stores, the PF 
values for cleaning products were calculated for a small set of chains. As in other cases, 
traditional retailers (open bazaar and grocery shops), local supermarkets and cash & carry 
stores had higher price differentiation than main chain stores. 
                                                 
29 TEKEL, the state monopoly company, used to have a monopolist position by law in the markets for 
alcoholic beverages and tobacco products. The market was gradually opened to competition, and a regulatory 
agency was established in 2002. Moreover, the alcoholic beverages division of TEKEL was privatized in 
2003.  The law grants the Tobacco and Alcoholic Beverages Board the right to set prices for those firms 
whose production, sales or imports are below a certain threshold level (the threshold level was 1 million liters 
per year and could be gradually reduced by the Board in the next five years). Large firms whose capacity is 
higher than the threshold level are free to set their own prices. There are similar restrictions in the tobacco 
products market. Whereas large firms with an annual capacity to produce at least 2 billion cigarettes or 
15,000 tons of other tobacco products per brand may freely import, price, distribute, and sell that brand, the 
price and marketing principles for small importers are determined by the Board. The first attempt to privatize 
the tobacco division of TEKEL in 2004 was unsuccessful.  The tobacco products market is highly 
concentrated.  There are three multinational firms (Philip Morris Sabancı (PMSA), JTI and British American 
Tobacco) that share half of the market (the other half is served by TEKEL). PMSA and JTI were 6
th and 23
rd 
largest private firms (in terms of turnover), respectively, in Turkey in 2003.   
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The data on price flexing indicate that there are some differences in product prices across 
different stores. These differences are higher among traditional outlets and local 
supermarkets that do not have common ownership. Therefore, local conditions seem to 
matter more for these retailers. In the case of chain store, there seems to be some price 
flexing, especially in personal care products. 
 
The data on prices give some information about the outcome of retailers’ conduct. 
Therefore, in order to get more information about pricing behavior, the survey included 
questions on what determines sale prices, and how firms apply price flexing.  
 
The retailers who participated in our survey suggest that input costs have a strong impact 
on sales prices (Table 12). Almost all retailers consider the impact of input costs on sales 
prices as “strong”. The second most important determinant of sales price is other retailers’ 
prices (half of respondents consider that other retailers’ prices have a “strong” impact on 
their own prices).  Large retailers take into consideration the demand for their products, 
and small retailers their stocks in pricing decisions. These findings suggest that retailers’ 
may have a certain degree of flexibility in setting their prices, i.e., they may have some 
market power. FMCG-suppliers prices, i.e., input prices for retailers, are determined 
largely by input conditions, the label on the product (private label), and payment 
conditions. Moreover, there is not any significant difference between small and large 
suppliers in term of pricing decisions. 
 
Since retailers (and, to some extent suppliers) are concerned about their competitors’ 
prices, we asked them if they regularly monitor competitors’ prices. All large retailers and 
almost all of small and medium-sized retailers (about 90 percent) said that they monitor 
other retailers’ prices regularly. Interestingly, supplies are also likely to monitor retailers’ 
prices (85 percent).  
 
Half of retailers acknowledge that they differentiate their prices across their stores (Table 
13).
30  Moreover, there is a monotonic increase by size in the share of price flexing firms. 
                                                 
30 In this table (and the following tables) the data on the proportions of firms are given. For example, in Table 
13, the number in first row, first column indicates that 33 percent of small retailers responded to the question  
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Although only 33 percent of small retailer said that they apply price flexing, the ratio 
increases to 53 percent for medium-sized retailers, and 75 percent for large retailers. The 
proportion of price differentiating firms is much higher in FMCG-supplying industries (68 
percent). Thus, price flexing observed in traditional retailers and local supermarkets may 
be caused by price differentiation by suppliers that have some market power. 
 
Other regional retailers’ prices seem to be the main determinant of price flexing. 85 
percent of firms that acknowledge price flexing consider local competition the main reason 
for price flexing. Prices set differently at new stores. Half of firms suggest that regional 
demand is important. It is interesting to observe that “regional cost differences” is found to 
be the least important reason among price flexing. FMCG-supplying firms revert to price 
flexing because of regional cost differences (65 percent of firms) and as a reaction to other 
suppliers’ prices (60 percent of firms). These findings indicate that there is a strong 
relationship between price setting and the degree of local competition in the retail sector.  
 
In addition to price flexing, price reduction through promotions is a widely-adopted 
strategy in the retail sector. Half of all retail firms indicate that they always apply 
promotions, and most of the remaining firms have promotions at least once a month. Price 
changes are also made frequently (at least once a month). Small retailers adjust prices 
either more frequently or adopt state-dependent pricing policies (change prices as a 
response to changes in input costs).  These findings support our conclusion on the stability 
of prices in large chain stores.  
 
Near- or below-cost selling is a practice used by some retailers to catch the attention of 
consumers. Some retail companies in our interviews indicated that it is used as an anti-
competitive practice by some large retailers. In order to assess the extent of near- or below-
cost selling in the retail sector, we asked retailers about the frequency of below-cost selling 
at their stores and in the sector at large. The same question was asked to FMCG suppliers 
as well. 
 
Below-cost selling seems to be quite common: more than half of retailers have applied 
near- or below-cost selling at least once a month (Table 14). However, contrary to our 
                                                                                                                                                    
apply “price flexing” (i.e., differentiate prices across stores). “n” in the table indicates the number of firms 
who responded to that particular question (item response rate).   
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prior expectations, it is applied more frequently by small rather than large retailers. Almost 
all retailers (about 90 percent) believe that below-cost selling is applied by other retailers at 
least once a month. These findings indicate that this practice is quite common but it is not 
used, by all retailers, to eliminate their competitors. Interestingly, the proportion of 
suppliers who believe that retailers’ apply below-cost selling is lower than the proportion 
of retailers who think so. 
 
Most of the firms (about 90 percent of retailers and suppliers) believe that below-cost 
selling causes unfair competition, but a large majority of them (74 percent of retailers and 
84 percent of suppliers) suggest that it cannot be used systematically (Table 15). A small 
group of firms (around 30 percent) claims that below-cost pricing is used to push 
competitors out of the market and/or makes the market more competitive. Below-cost 
selling is used as a marketing method according to half of retailers. However, this practice 
seems to be harmful for suppliers (64 percent of retailers, 83 percent of suppliers), possibly 
because of the fact that suppliers in some cases are required to accept lower prices. 
 
Supplier-retailer relation is a contentious issue in studies on the dynamics of competition   
in the retail sector. There could be two types of distortions in supplier-retailer relations. 
First, if suppliers have market power, they can try to blockade entry by other suppliers 
through various restrictions (for example, exclusivity agreements) or providing discounts 
not related to production and marketing costs (shelf space, product range, etc.). Second, if 
retailers have market power, they can impose certain fees on suppliers that are not related 
their costs (listing fees, slotting fees, etc.).  
 
In order to analyze supplier-retailer relations, we first get information about procurement 
and distribution channels suppliers and retailers use. An average retailer in our sample 
buys products from 500 suppliers (Table 16). There is a positive relation between the size 
of the retailer and the number of suppliers: although a small retailer buys from 180 
suppliers, a medium-sized retailer is served by 400 suppliers. The number of suppliers a 
large retailer deals with reaches 1250 (median values for size categories). These data are 
consistent with the number of products sold by retail size. Moreover, small retailers prefer 
to buy from suppliers that sell a wide range of products. Small retailers buy about 50 
products per supplier, medium-sized retailers 30 products per supplier, and large retailers 
20 product per supplier.   
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Most of large retailers (60 percent) buy products directly from suppliers thanks to large 
quantities they purchase. However, small and medium-size retailers rely mainly on 
distributors (about 55 percent). A small group of retailers (only 20 percent) buy their 
products through wholesalers. The share of wholesalers seems to be small.
31  
 
On the supplier side, most of suppliers use distributors to supply their products. Large 
suppliers tend to use more suppliers than small and medium-sized suppliers do. The share 
of suppliers who sell their products through wholesalers is small (21 percent). The rest of 
suppliers (26 percent) sell their products directly to retailers. 
 
There is a dual structure in supplier-retailer relationship. First, there is a relationship 
between large retailer and large/suppliers. Second is the relationship between small 
retailers and distributors. Large retailers can act as a counterveiling power to large 
suppliers that may have market power in specific FMCGs industries (Dobson et al., 2001). 
Moreover, they set supply prices at the national level, and reduce regional/locational 
differences in prices, as observed in price flexing (Figures 3a-3d). Small retailers may 
subject to restrictive vertical agreements by distributors and are likely to be open to the 
effects of regional factors.  
 
Table 17 summarizes the data on supplier-retailer relations. No significant difference is 
found between practices of small and large retailers.
32 Retailers claim that suppliers share 
frequently to the costs of promotions, i.e., they pay for promotions (insert fee, etc.). 
Slotting/position fees (gondola, “palet”, etc., fees that depend on shelf position) are paid 
less frequently. Listing fee (fee paid for listing the first time) is applied “sometimes”, and 
shelf fee (fee paid for the duration of listing) is not common. However, all suppliers, 
irrespective of their size, claim that promotion, slotting and listing fees are charged 
frequently by retailers. It seems that charging these fees is commonly accepted as a 
conduct of business. These practices could make entry by new suppliers more difficult. 
 
                                                 
31 Recall that our sample of retailers is much larger than the sector average. 
32 There is only one exception. Packing of products by suppliers is observed more often among large retailers 
than small ones.   
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In terms of supply conditions, suppliers are almost always are required to take back 
returned items. Moreover, large retailers frequently ask suppliers to do packing (small 
retailers usually do not have the power to impose such a condition), and small suppliers 
face with such demands by retailers more frequently than large suppliers do.  
 
There are two potentially problematic practices that can be applied by retailers and 
suppliers: exclusivity restrictions on suppliers (requiring suppliers not to sell their products 
to other retailers), and prices fixing by suppliers. Retailers and suppliers agree that 
exclusivity restrictions on suppliers are imposed rarely and price fixing occurs 
“sometimes”.  
 
Regarding discounts provided by suppliers, the most common types are quantity-based 
(volume) discounts and advance payment discounts. These types of discounts are closely 
related to the cost of supply. As noted earlier, suppliers provide discounts to support 
promotions launched by retailers. Potentially anti-competitive practices, discounts based 
on product rage, shelf area and exclusivity restrictions (retailer required not to sell 
competitive suppliers’ products) are observed less frequently. These restrictions, if 
imposed by dominant suppliers, may create entry barriers for new suppliers.  
 
In order to check the extent of price discrimination by suppliers (through, for example, 
abovementioned discounts), we asked retailers if they pay the same price as other retailers 
do. A majority of retailers (68 percent) claimed that there is no difference in prices, 23 
percent pay lower prices, and only 9 percent pay higher prices. When asked about what 
they could do if they discover that a supplier sold the same product to other retailers at a 
lower price, half of retailers stated that they can charge retrospective discounts (to match 
the price differential) to the supplier.  
 
There are 10 retailers (4 medium-sized and 6 large) in our sample that are a member of a 
business group that also owns supplier firms. When asked about the relations with 
suppliers in the same group, 6 retailers (4 of them are medium-sized) said that they provide 
preferential access to shelf space for their sister suppliers, and 5 (4 medium-sized) of them 
get lower prices and/or better payment conditions. Among the sample of suppliers, 4 (2 
medium-sized) have sister retailers. 3 (2 medium-sized) suppliers stated that they get 
preferential access to shelf space in sister retailers, and they offer lower prices and/or better  
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payment conditions. Although the number of vertically related retailers/suppliers is small, 
these findings suggest that retailers (and suppliers) tend to favor their sister companies. 
This practice could be a concern for competition policy if any one of the vertically-related 
companies has a dominant position in the market. However, in our sample, it seems that 
medium-sized companies, not the large ones, have a stronger tendency to establish 
preferential relations with their sister companies.
33 In other words, the relations between 
vertically-related suppliers and retailers is not, at least for time being, likely to distort 
competitive conditions in the retail sector. 
 
Private label products have an increasing market share and changed the competitive 
conditions in the market (for competitive effects of private label products, see Cotterill, 
Putsis Jr. and Dhar, 2000; Morton and Zettelmeyer, 2004; Sayman and Raju, 2004; Steiner, 
2004). The share of private label products in total sales is quite high (the arithmetic 
average across all product categories is around 30 percent). Cleaning products, packed 
food products, milk products and paper products have higher private label shares. Large 
retailers have somewhat higher private label sales in these categories. Moreover, retailers, 
especially large ones, expect that the share of private label products will continue to 
increase in the next three years in all product categories. 
 
It seems that a large number of suppliers are involved in private label production. Almost 
all firms producing cleaning products produce private label products for retailers, whereas 
the proportion of suppliers that produce private label products is about 40-50 percent in 
food and beverages categories. The share of private label products in total turnover is 
around 16 percent: it is quite high in the case of cleaning products (43 percent), and low in 
food products (6 percent). Private label products have a higher share in total turnover of 
small firms (33 percent). They contribute to 10 percent of turnover of medium-sized 
retailers and only 3 percent of turnover of large retailers. Large suppliers that market their 
products under national, well-known brand names are involved in private label production 
in small quantities. 
 
                                                 
33 A sales manager of a large retailer that belongs to a business group claimed in the interview that they do 
not have special arrangements with their sister supplier companies because they operate independently as 
profit centers within the group.   
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Retailers and suppliers believe that private label products are of inferior quality (Table 18). 
Partly because of this reason, production cost is thought to be lower. A majority of retailers 
and suppliers agree that these products are cheaper than national brands. There are more 
suppliers who believe that private label products are relatively cheaper than those who 
believe that their production cost is lower. Thus, there seems to be a reputation premium 
on national brands. 
 
 
5. The future 
 
The organized retail market (local supermarkets and chain stores) have grown rapidly at 
the expense of traditional retail formats (grocery shops and open bazaar). Of course, 
organized retailers face with certain problems in developing their businesses. They claim 
that (high) tax rates restrict their growth (Table 19). This is the most important obstacle 
cited by small and medium-sized retailers. In addition to taxes, land/store availability and 
competition from informal firms are also important barriers for further growth of the 
organized retail sector. It seems that urban areas develop without a proper implementation 
of well-designed city planning in Turkey. This has the most adverse effect on retailing 
sector. Since it is rather difficult to find an estate suitable for a large-scale store in city 
centers, the rents and prices for suitable places/areas in city centers may reach prohibitive 
levels.  In order to overcome this problem, the large-scale retailers prefer to acquire 
supermarkets located in central areas. The lack of suitable locations acts as a significant 
entry barriers for supermarkets and large chains, and prevents their rapid diffusion. 
 
Small and medium-sized retailers consider competition from large chain stores as a 
noteworthy obstacle. Regulations, macroeconomic uncertainty, costs of financing financial 
and transportation facilities are only partially important. Interestingly, consumer demand is 
among the least important factor that inhibits retailers’ growth. This is a striking finding 
because the SIS survey on capacity utilization finds consistently that the most important 
reason for underutilization of production capacity in manufacturing industries in Turkey is 
the lack of (domestic) demand.  
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Retail characteristics that determine competitiveness provide the clue to understand which 
retail formats are likely to grow in the future. All retailers, large and small, said that the 
most important determinant of competitiveness in the retail sector is stores’ location (Table 
20). It is followed by quality-related aspects (product quality, product range/ diversity, and 
retailer' s brand/reputation), and prices (promotions, proximity to consumers, and prices). 
Other services offered by the retail (parking, packing, store’s appearance and loyalty cards) 
are slightly less important than quality and prices. Product brand is also among the 
partially important factors. Given those factors, retailers (and suppliers as well) believe that 
hypermarkets, supermarkets and discounters will increase their market shares in the next 
decade. Some suppliers (20 percent of all suppliers) predict that cash & carry and gas 
station markets will also increase their markets shares. There is almost no firm that 
believes that grocery shops, open bazaars and specialized markets (butchers, green 
groceries, etc.) will be able to increase their market shares. Consistent with these 
predictions, all large retailers who responded to the survey plan to open new stores in the 
next three years. There are three out of 17 medium-sized and 4 out of 14 small retailers that 
do not envisage any increase in the number of stores. No retailer predicts any contraction 
in the number of stores it currently operates. One small retailer stated that it plans to exit 
from the market in the next three years. 
 
Almost all retailers and suppliers (about 90 percent of firms) expect that foreign retailers’ 
market share will increase in the next decade (Table 21). The proportion of small retailers 
that expect an increase in foreign presence is a little lower (75 percent). Those firms that 
predict foreign entry in the retail market believe that, as a result of foreign entry, retail 
prices will decline somewhat, and product quality and diversity will increase to a large 
extent. Retailers, especially small ones, are skeptical on the impact of foreign entry on 
domestic suppliers’ production, but suppliers, especially small ones, are hopeful that 
domestic suppliers’ production may increase as a result of foreign entry. 
 
As noted in the second section of this study, there is no specific law regulating the retail 
market in Turkey. A draft law prepared last year initiated an intense debate on a number of 
issues. It is obvious that almost all retailers and suppliers are in favor of having a law 
regulating the retail market (Table 22). Majority of retailers (67 percent) and almost all 
suppliers (90 percent) support the idea that the law should impose restrictions on below-
cost sales. The stance of suppliers on this issue is consistent with their opinion that below- 
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cost sales are harmful for suppliers. Suppliers are also strongly in favor of restrictions on 
payment conditions and exclusivity agreements whereas small and medium-sized retailers 
are indifferent and large retailers are weakly against these restrictions. While retailers, 
especially large ones, are against restrictions on promotions, suppliers are somewhat in 
favor of these restrictions, too. Overall, suppliers seem to be worried that retailers could 
pass on the costs of fierce competition in the market on their shoulders. 
 
The issue of imposing restrictions on private label sales by retailers (such as 20 percent 
ceiling) is a contested area where suppliers and retailers, and small and large firms disagree 
each other. Large retailers who can capitalize on the reputation they establish in the market 
by selling more private label products are against restrictions on private label sales, 
whereas medium-sized and large suppliers, who consider private label as a threat to their 
national brands, are in favor of these restrictions. Small and medium-sized retailers, who 
may not benefit much from private label products, are somewhat in favor of restrictions, 
and small suppliers, whose position may not differ under private label production, are 
indifferent. Private label products seem to be a tool that may shift the benefits of brand 
name advantages in favor of large retailers. 
 
 
6. Issues for competition policy 
 
The conduct of firms in the retail and supplier sectors has received considerable attention 
due to its direct impact on consumers. There have been 23 complaints on retailers made to 
the Competition Authority in the period 1998-2003. Most of these complaints are about 
below-cost selling and discriminatory practices.  
 
The common feature of below-cost selling complaints is the claim that hypermarkets sell 
their products at excessively low prices that may force small retailers to exit from the 
market. According to the Competition Law, below-cost selling or excessively low prices 
can be deemed as the violation of the law only if the undertaking concerned has a dominant 
position in the relevant market. The law defines dominant position as “any position 
enjoyed in a certain market by one or more enterprises by virtue of which, those enterprises 
have the power to act independently of their competitors and purchasers in determining  
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economic parameters such as the amount of production or distribution, price and supply”. 
The Competition Board rejected all complaints about below-cost selling as out of scope by 
arguing that the dominant position of any hypermarket in the relevant market is unlikely 
because of low concentration ratios in the market, low entry barriers and dynamic market 
conditions. 
   
Other main complaints brought before the Competition Board are concerned with 
discriminatory practices done by suppliers against small retailers in favor of large retailers. 
Complaints were generally brought by small retailers or the Chamber of Small Grocery 
Shops (Bakkallar Federasyonu Odası ). They claimed that suppliers sell their products 
under more favorable conditions to large retailers. The Competition Board deemed almost 
all these complaints as out of scope because it decided that small retailers and large 
retailers are not in equivalent position because of differences in their sizes, volumes of 
purchased products, product diversity, etc. 
 
There are two cases of infringement of the Competition Law. The Competition Board 
decided in the case brought by the Istanbul Food Wholesale Traders Association (IGTOD) 
that a number of large food suppliers (Benckiser, Sezginler, Ülker, Besler, Eczacıba￿ı 
Procter & Gamble, Marsa Kraft Jacobs Suchard, Unilever, and LeverElida) violated the 
law by imposing sales restrictions on their distributors. Likewise, another food supplier 




There have been five merger cases in retail trade brought before the Competition Board 
since 1998. In the first case, Metro and Migros joint venture (1998), the Board granted a 
conditional permission, but the venture was not established later on. In all other cases, 
Do￿u￿ Holding-Tansa￿ (1999), Carrefour-Continent (2000), Tesco-Kipa (2003), and 
Carrefour-Gima/Endi (2005) the Board permitted mergers unconditionally. 
                                                 
34 Frito-Lay was the dominant firm in the salty-snack market in Turkey (two largest firms controlled about 98 
percent of the market). It was found that, Frito-Lay tried to establish an exclusive sales network at the final 
sales points, especially in traditional retailers, in the period 1998-2003. The sales agreements explicitly stated 
that the retailer could not sell any other brands. Frito-Lay applied also special promotions (awards, gifts, 
discounts, bonuses, etc.) aimed at achieving exclusivity. Since Frito-Lay’s sales personnel visited retailers 
once or twice a week, it was able to enforce the exclusivity agreements. After the investigation, the 
Competition Board decided to withdraw the exemption for the non-competition (exclusivity) clause in 
vertical agreements done between Frito-Lay and the retailers (final sale points), because it did not bring out 
any economic benefit or efficiency gains, and acted as an barrier to entry.   
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As noted earlier, there is no special legislation regarding the establishment of large retailers 
in Turkey. There have been several attempts to introduce a law for this purpose, and three 
draft laws were brought before the Competition Board in recent years. Although there were 
some differences between these laws, the common aim was to help small retailers 
(groceries, green groceries, etc.) by forcing large stores to be located “outside” the city.  
 
The first draft law prepared in 2001 aimed at regulating the establishment of stores having 
a sales area greater than 250 m
2 subject to the permission obtained from a Board composed 
of the Municipality, Chamber of Commerce, Competition Board and consumer 
associations. The Board would give its decision by considering the location (its distance to 
the city centre), demand and supply conditions in the city concerned, and the 
competitiveness of small retailers. The same procedure would apply to the stores that are 
larger than 1000 m
2 that would be located 5 km away from the city centre. 
 
The second draft law was prepared by Ministry of Trade and Industry in 2003. The 
difference between the first and second laws was the fact the latter one did not envisage 
any special Board. It assigned the authority to the governor or the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade according to size of large stores. It also included provisions that prohibited certain 
forms of conduct (predatory pricing tactics, etc.) that could be addressed indirectly under 
the Competition Act. 
 
The last draft law was put on the agenda in 2004. Those above-mentioned prohibitions 
were excluded from draft law after the Competition Board’s objections. Although there are 
some improvements in the new draft law, the Competition Board opposed to two issues 
concerning restriction of private label sales by large stores (the draft law envisaged 20 
percent limit for private label sales) and limitations on low-price sales promotions. The 
Competition Board states that these restrictions harm consumers (by preventing price 
competition) and small and medium-sized manufactures (who can gain competitive 
advantage by producing private label products for large retailers). It seems that the law is 
not agenda of the government, and is not likely to be enacted in recent future.  
 
Although most of the retailers and suppliers who participated in our survey stated that they 
welcome a law on regulating the retail market, restrictions on different forms of  
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competitive practices and on the location of large stores need to be tackled with care. Since 
the competition law provides sufficient safeguards against any anti-competitive behavior, 
there may not be any need to introduce additional general restrictions. The idea of 
protecting small retailers by imposing a ban on the establishment of new large stores 
around the city center is also questionable because it basically helps the incumbent large 
retailers. The issue of land provision for large stores and shopping centers can be better 





Major findings of our analysis can be summarized as follows: 
￿ The retail market in Turkey is competitive. There are no legal restrictions on entry, and 
no discrimination against foreign companies. 
￿ Prices across retail formats differ substantially for a market operating on a very thin 
profit margin. However, these differences are likely to stem from cost differences. 
￿ There are some practices applied by retail companies that are potentially anti-
competitive (price flexing, listing fees, slotting fees, etc.). However, these practices do 
not distort competition in the retail market seriously, because these companies seem to 
lack a significant degree of market power. There are some practices applied by supplier 
companies that are potentially anti-competitive (discounts based on exclusivity 
agreements, shelf area, product range, etc.). These practices could distort competition 
because of high level of concentration in certain markets. These markets need to be 
scrutinized closely by the Competition Authority to guarantee further development of 
the retail market. 
￿ Supermarkets, chains stores and foreign firms are likely to increase their market shares 
in the future. Any single retailer may not seem to establish a dominant position in the 
national market. However, the relevant markets in the retail sector should be defined 
locally rather than nationally. It is possible that some retailers may establish a dominant 
position in certain local markets, especially following a merger activity and/or exits.
35  
                                                 
35 After the first draft of this study was written, Carrefour announced on May 3, 2005, that they reached an 
agreement with Fiba Holding to acquire Gima and Endi for USD 132 million and it would become Turkey’s 
biggest food retailer after the acquisition. (The merger was later approved by the Competition Board on June 
17.) Koç Holding reacted to this announcement by stating that they had reached an agreement with Fiba  
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￿ The share of private label products is likely to increase in the future. The increase in 
the share of private label is likely to lead to a more competitive retail market. 
￿ These trends may have a slightly positive impact on retail prices, especially if discount 
stores continue to increase their market shares. 
￿ These trends are likely to have a positive impact on product diversity and the quality of 
products/services offered by retail stores. 
￿ Employment impact of these trends could be negative because turnover/employee ratio 
is three times higher in chain stores than in traditional retailers. However, modern retail 
formats can generate new jobs if they provide additional services for their customers. 
￿ The transformation of the retail market is likely to have a long-lasting impact on 
wholesale trade and the distribution of FMCGs as well. Traditional wholesalers are the 
most likely losers, because large retailers tend to buy directly from suppliers. Logistics 
companies that provide a wide range of complementary services will play an 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. FMCG wholesale and retail trade sectors, 1997, 1999 and2001
(million USD)
Number of Number of Number of Payments Input Output Value Total
estab. empl. engaged to empl. added sales
1997
51 - Wholesale trade (except of motor vehicles and motorcycles)
5121 - Agricultural raw materials and live animals    2 408    12 832    14 603     42     77     967     889    1 949
5122 - Food, beverages and tobacco    15 705    69 559    82 901     177     299    2 463    2 164    14 393
52 - Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods
5211 - Retail sale in non-specialized stores    172 741    96 460    319 583     270     416    2 997    2 581    11 627
5219 - Other retail sale in non-specialized stores (department stores, etc)    8 099    29 241    39 574     109     166     852     687    4 461
5220 - Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in specialized stores (manav, kasap, vb)    58 562    31 365    109 014     53     167    1 182    1 015    4 759
5231 - Retail sale of pharmaceutical and medical goods, cosmetic and toilet articles    20 717    23 940    46 906     45     113     712     600    2 503
5259 - Other non-store retail sale     56     546     563     1     3     9     6     14
 
1999  
51 - Wholesale trade (except of motor vehicles and motorcycles)
5121 - Agricultural raw materials and live animals ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿     64     109    1 256    1 147    3 398
5122 - Food, beverages and tobacco ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿     246     569    4 456    3 888    19 676
52 - Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods
5211 - Retail sale in non-specialized stores ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿     399     520    3 950    3 431    15 247
5219 - Other retail sale in non-specialized stores (department stores, etc) ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿     205     273    1 353    1 080    5 477
5220 - Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in specialized stores (manav, kasap, vb) ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿     72     245    1 631    1 385    6 124
5231 - Retail sale of pharmaceutical and medical goods, cosmetic and toilet articles ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿     61     120     869     749    2 885
5259 - Other non-store retail sale ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿     2     3     13     10     23
 
2001  
51 - Wholesale trade (except of motor vehicles and motorcycles)
5121 - Agricultural raw materials and live animals ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿     56     118    1 083     965    2 181
5122 - Food, beverages and tobacco ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿     264     513    4 720    4 207    17 189
52 - Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods
5211 - Retail sale in non-specialized stores ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿     256     373    2 371    1 998    10 406
5219 - Other retail sale in non-specialized stores (department stores, etc) ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿     146     214     894     680    3 879
5220 - Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in specialized stores (manav, kasap, vb) ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿     63     183    1 361    1 178    4 296
5231 - Retail sale of pharmaceutical and medical goods, cosmetic and toilet articles ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿     66     95     941     846    3 213
5259 - Other non-store retail sale ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿     1     2     8     6     69
Source: SIS.  
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Table 2. Value added, FMCG-related sectors, 1997-2001
(million USD)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
A - Agriculture, hunting and forestry 25815 33758 26665 27206 17890
 
D - Manufacturing  
15 - Food products and beverages
151 - Meat, fish, fruit, vegetables, oils and fats
1511 - Meat and meat products 373 543 381 476 259
1512 - Fish and fish products 53 27 20 20 17
1513 - Fruit and vegetables 680 687 744 610 569
1514 - Vegetable and animal oils and fats 650 653 564 492 419
152 - Dairy products
1520 - Dairy products 235 305 384 412 224
153 - Grain mill products, starches, animal feeds 
1531 - Grain mill products 191 225 196 209 136
1532 - Starches and starch products 31 42 41 33 26
1533 - Animal feeds 171 212 270 224 81
154 - Other food products
1541 - Bakery products 323 336 286 304 197
1542 - Sugar 203 414 401 410 396
1543 - Cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery 343 341 451 312 359
1544 - Macaroni, noodles, couscous  71 83 54 59 44
1549 - Other food products n.e.c. 336 479 373 461 307
155 - Beverages
1551 - Spirits; ethyl alcohol  177 438 523 444 453
1552 - Wines 17 20 15 14 16
1553 - Malt liquors and malt 231 225 215 208 191
1554 - Soft drinks, mineral waters 270 269 333 209 258
16 - Tobacco products
160 - Tobacco products
1600 - Tobacco products 552 817 1000 1063 2015
21 - Paper and paper products
210 - Paper and paper products
2101 - Pulp, paper and paperboard 181 159 161 260 162
2102 - Corrugated paper, containers 228 269 250 244 214
2109 - Other articles of paper and paperboard 242 474 170 193 144
24 - Chemicals and chemical products
242 - Other chemical products
2424 - Soap and detergents, cleaning preparations, perfumes 851 468 920 655 518
Total 6412 7487 7752 7312 7004
 
G - Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods  
51 - Wholesale trade (except of motor vehicles and motorcycles)  
512 - Agricultural raw materials, live animals, food, beverages and tobacco  
5121 - Agricultural raw materials and live animals 889 977 1147 1632 965
5122 - Food, beverages and tobacco 2164 2843 3888 3930 4207
52 - Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods  
521 - Non-specialized retail trade in stores  
5211 - Retail sale in non-specialized stores 2581 2879 3431 3668 1998
5219 - Other retail sale in non-specialized stores (department stores, etc) 687 1193 1080 1069 680
522 - Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in specialized stores  
5220 - Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in specialized stores (manav, kasap, vb) 1015 1214 1385 1873 1178
523 - Other retail trade of new goods in specialized stores  
5231 - Retail sale of pharmaceutical and medical goods, cosmetic and toilet articles 600 706 749 811 846
525 - Retail trade not in stores  
5259 - Other non-store retail sale 6 10 10 8 6
Total 7943 9822 11690 12993 9879
 
H - Hotels and restaurants  
55 - Hotels and restaurants  
551 - Hotels; camping sites and other provision of short-stay accommodation  
5510 - Hotels; camping sites and other provision of short-stay accommodation 1797 1954 2449 2997 2489
552 - Restaurants, bars and canteens  
5520 - Restaurants, bars and canteens (includes catering activities and take-out activities) 2385 2376 3491 4449 3250
Total 4182 4330 5940 7446 5739
Total (all sectors except agriculture) 18537 21639 25382 27750 22622
Note: The data on manufacturing industries exclude private establishments employing less than 10 people.
Source: SIS   
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Table 3. Concentration rates in domestic production, FMCG-related sectors, 1997-2001
n CR4 n CR4 n CR4 n CR4 n CR4
D - Manufacturing  
15 - Food products and beverages  
151 - Meat, fish, fruit, vegetables, oils and fats 
1511 - Meat and meat products 94 33.4 110 29.6 99 32.4 101 31.2 99 34.7
1512 - Fish and fish products 16 90.5 19 82.8 17 77.5 14 79.7 16 68.1
1513 - Fruit and vegetables 239 17.6 251 21.4 240 11.8 226 16.3 234 20.0
1514 - Vegetable and animal oils and fats 124 48.4 120 42.5 108 43.2 103 44.0 95 35.1
152 - Dairy products  
1520 - Dairy products 113 51.1 118 50.0 112 51.4 110 49.5 114 51.8
153 - Grain mill products, starches, animal feeds   
1531 - Grain mill products 305 16.3 310 16.6 279 24.0 272 22.8 264 18.1
1532 - Starches and starch products 10 93.5 8 96.7 7 96.4 7 96.6 6 95.8
1533 - Animal feeds 141 23.9 149 26.3 144 27.9 134 29.1 130 33.0
154 - Other food products  
1541 - Bakery products 431 36.6 442 38.6 390 39.0 365 43.8 372 35.5
1542 - Sugar 35 39.1 34 33.2 34 35.9 35 32.0 39 35.9
1543 - Cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery 86 64.1 91 59.3 84 59.1 85 59.6 85 61.4
1544 - Macaroni, noodles, couscous  15 79.2 16 68.0 13 75.7 16 69.1 19 61.6
1549 - Other food products n.e.c. 101 39.4 106 41.4 106 43.4 110 38.4 113 38.3
155 - Beverages  
1551 - Spirits; ethyl alcohol  15 58.5 13 65.8 14 71.4 14 73.7 13 71.3
1552 - Wines 12 72.2 14 71.5 12 77.5 12 72.1 13 73.5
1553 - Malt liquors and malt 9 74.6 10 79.5 9 69.0 8 76.5 8 77.2
1554 - Soft drinks, mineral waters 54 65.7 60 67.0 60 63.5 55 67.9 54 75.0
16 - Tobacco products  
160 - Tobacco products  
1600 - Tobacco products 38 54.8 39 58.9 35 57.6 28 61.4 25 66.7
21 - Paper and paper products  
210 - Paper and paper products  
2101 - Pulp, paper and paperboard 40 46.7 46 37.7 40 35.9 43 31.5 46 36.6
2102 - Corrugated paper, containers 101 24.9 117 26.2 105 27.2 107 26.4 116 26.1
2109 - Other articles of paper and paperboard 50 59.9 68 60.1 52 47.7 60 46.3 56 42.5
24 - Chemicals and chemical products  
242 - Other chemical products  
2424 - Soap and detergents, cleaning preparations, perfumes 63 62.1 67 64.9 64 71.2 63 63.3 71 66.8
52 - Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods
521 - Non-specialized retail trade in stores 194127 10.8 194934 11.5
Source: SIS, Concentration Rates in Manufacturing; Sector 52, authors' estimates.





Table 4. Profit margins in FMCG-related sectors, 1997-2002
(operating profits/turnover)
Sectors (ISIC Rev. 3) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
011 Growing of crops 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.11
012 Farming of animals 0.08 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.10
014 Agricultural and animal husbandry service activities 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02
050 Fishing, fish farms 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.08
151 Meat products 0.01 0.10 0.06 -0.04 0.00 0.04
152 Fish products 0.12 0.16 0.17 0.01 0.06 0.08
153 Fruit and vegetables 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.06
154 Vegetable and animal oils and fats 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.05
155 Dairy products 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02
156 Grain mill products 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
157 Animal feeds 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.06
158 Other food products 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.12
159 Beverages 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.10
160 Tobacco products 0.16 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.13
211 Pulp, paper and paperboard 0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.04
212 Containers of paper and paperboard 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.13
245 Other chemical products 0.14 0.18 0.17 0.11 0.13 0.12
512 Wholesale of agricultural raw materials 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.03
513 Wholesale of food, beverages and tobacco 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
521 Non-specialized retail trade in stores 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02
523 Retail trade of new goods in specialized stores 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.08 0.11 0.06
551 Hotels; camping sites 0.10 0.08 -0.02 0.04 0.10 0.08
553 Restaurants, bars and canteens  -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03
Source: The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey   
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Table 5. Restrictiveness index scores for distribution services (wholesale and retail trade)
Developed EU-15 Latin Asia Turkey
countries America
Domestic Index
Restrictions on commercial land 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.000
Direct investment in distribution firms 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
Restrictions on large-scale stores 0.011 0.012 0.000 0.009 0.000
Factors affecting investment 0.005 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.000
Local government requirements 0.017 0.005 0.013 0.011 0.000
Restrictions on establishment total 0.033 0.025 0.015 0.039 0.000
Wholesale import licensing 0.005 0.001 0.011 0.019 0.000
Limits on promotion of retail products 0.007 0.008 0.004 0.003 0.000
Statutory government monopolies 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.013
Protection of intellectual property rights 0.014 0.050 0.018 0.028 0.050
Restrictions on ongoing operations total 0.031 0.060 0.038 0.055 0.063
Domestic index total 0.064 0.085 0.053 0.094 0.063
Foreign Index
Restrictions on commercial land 0.043 0.100 0.000 0.038 0.000
Direct investment in distribution firms 0.000 0.005 0.031 0.085 0.000
Restrictions on large-scale stores 0.011 0.012 0.000 0.009 0.000
Factors affecting investment 0.010 0.012 0.004 0.018 0.000
Local government requirements 0.017 0.005 0.017 0.015 0.000
Permanent movement of people   0.013 0.020 0.027 0.011 0.031
Restrictions on establishment total 0.094 0.153 0.080 0.176 0.031
Wholesale import licensing 0.005 0.001 0.011 0.023 0.000
Limits on promotion of retail products 0.007 0.008 0.004 0.003 0.000
Statutory government monopolies 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.013
Protection of intellectual property rights 0.014 0.050 0.018 0.028 0.050
Licensing requirements on management 0.033 0.019 0.030 0.038 0.014
Temporary movement of people  0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.019
Restrictions on ongoing operations total 0.071 0.086 0.074 0.105 0.096
Foreign index total 0.165 0.239 0.154 0.281 0.126
Source: Productivity Commission Trade Restrictiveness Database, Australia
Note: Developed countries: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, Switzerland and United States; EU-15: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United 
Kingdom; Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela; Asia: India, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, 
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Table 6. Vertical integration in FMCGs sector in Turkey
Business group
Wholesale/Distribution   Hotels and Restaurants
Store Brands Retail Formats Company Name  Sector Company Name Company Name
 Sabancı Holding Carrefoursa Hypermarket Marsa Kraft Oils and fats Philip Morrissa Tursa A.￿.
Championsa Supermarket Gıdasa Macaroni, flour Ankara Enternasyonel.
Diasa Discount Store juice, biscuit, cake  Otelcilik A:.￿.
Philsa Tobacco
 Koç Holding Migros  Hypermarket Tat Meat products, dairy Düzey Pazarlama A.￿. Divan A.￿.
Supermarket products, macoroni Talya A.￿.
￿ok Discount Store canned food 
bottled water
 Do￿u￿ Holding Tansa￿ Supermarket Antur Turizm 




 Fiba Holding Gima Supermarket
Endi Discount Store 
 Azizler Holding B￿M Discount Store
 Kombassan  Afra Hypermarket Komas Gıda Macaroni, flour, Baykur A.￿. Bera Turizm
Supermarket dry food Hotel Bera
Kardelen A.￿. Bottled water
 Yimpa￿ Holding Yimpa￿ Hypermarket Aytaç Meat products, dairy Yimpa￿ Otelcilik ve
Proma Supermarket products, oils and fats Restoranları
bottled water, juice
 Canerler Group Canerler Hypermarket Anmar Mineral waters
Supermarket Beka  Dry food
Keybi Supermarket Sö￿üt  Meat products
 ￿ttifak Holding Adese Hypermarket Selva Gıda Macaroni
Source: Compiled by authors' from company web sites.
S  e  c  t  o  r  s





Table 7. Establishment year of survey firms
Total Foreign Holding Total Foreign Holding
1983 and before 6 3 38 3 11
1984-1988 5 1 12 3 5
1989-1993 19 3 4 11 2 1
1994-1998 13 2 2 7 2
1999-2003 7 1 5 1
Unknown 1 1 6 1 1
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Table 8. Survey coverage
Sales Number of Firm size
(million USD) employees (million USD)
SIS, 2001
Total retail (521 and 522) 18581 721917 0.093
    521 - Non-specialized retail trade in stores 14285 563330 0.088
    522 - Retail sale in specialized stores 4296 158587 0.116
Total suppliers
a 18602 194166 9.357
HTP, 2003
Total 14438




c, 2001 2608 35063 59.3
Retail, 47 firms
c, 2003 4368 40025 92.9
Supplier, 69 firms, 2001 3418 53234 49.5
Coverage ratios
SIS total retail, 2001 0.140 0.049
SIS non-specialized retail trade, 2001 0.183 0.062
SIS suppliers, 2001 0.184 0.274
HTP total, 2003 0.303
HTP >supermarkets, 2003 0.946
a Supplier industries (ISIC Rev 3): 1511, 1512, 1513, 1514, 1520, 1531, 1532, 1533, 1541, 1542, 1543, 1544, 1549, 
1551, 1552, 1553, 1554, 1600, 2101, 2102, 2109 and 2424.
b There are 51 and 79 firms who responded to the retail and supplier surveys, respectively.
c Turnover for 8 firms estimated as 0.78 and 0.11 USD turnover/employee in 2001 and 2003, respectively.  
 
 
Table 9. Size distribution of survey firms
Total Foreign Holding Total Foreign Holding
Small 16 1 25 2 1
Medium 19 5 19 1 5
Large 16 5 6 26 5 13
Unknown 9 1 3
Total 51 5 12 79 9 22
For retailers, small: <150 employees (<10 million USD turnover); medium: 150-499 employees
(10-50 million USD turnover); large: 500+ employees (50+ million USD turnover).
For suppliers, small: <20 million USD turnover; medium: 20-50 million USD turnover; large:
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Table 10. Number of stores by size, 2000-2003
2000 2001 2002 2003
Small retailers (total) 18 31 39 71
    Hypermarket (>2500 m2) 0 0 0 0
    Large supermarket (1000-2500 m2) 4 6 7 10
    Supermarket (400-1000 m2) 7 10 14 21
    Small süpermarket (100-400 m2) 6 14 17 39
    Market (50-100 m2) 1 1 1 1
    Total area (000 m2) 13.5 21.1 26.4 42.0
    n 10 12 12 14
Medium-sized retailers (total) 122 142 162 206
    Hypermarket (>2500 m2) 3 3 4 4
    Large supermarket (1000-2500 m2) 5 8 13 19
    Supermarket (400-1000 m2) 63 71 73 96
    Small süpermarket (100-400 m2) 50 59 71 86
    Market (50-100 m2) 1 1 1 1
    Total area (000 m2) 75.9 89.0 105.7 136.0
    n 14 14 14 15
Large retailers - excl. foreign (total) 774 857 895 915
    Hypermarket (>2500 m2) 51 62 67 69
    Large supermarket (1000-2500 m2) 102 112 117 125
    Supermarket (400-1000 m2) 162 179 192 221
    Small süpermarket (100-400 m2) 456 500 516 497
    Market (50-100 m2) 3 4 3 3
    Total area (000 m2) 584.6 663.6 702.9 739.4
    n 10 11 11 11
Foreign retailers (total) 581 684 801 958
    Hypermarket (>2500 m2) 15 28 31 32
    Large supermarket (1000-2500 m2) 0 3 3 5
    Supermarket (400-1000 m2) 0 0 0 0
    Small süpermarket (<400 m2) 566 653 767 921
    Small süpermarket (100-400 m2) 0 0 0 0
    Total area (000 m2) 194.0 266.5 305.5 351.0
    n 3 4 4 4
Note: Data from 44 retailers
Total area is estimated by assuming 3500 m2 area for hypermarkets. For all other stores,
the mid-values are used.  
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Table 11. Relavant market for retailers
(per cent of retailers)
Small Medium-sized Large Total
 retailers  retailers  retailers
Consumer group (socio-economic status)
A category 0.56 0.53 0.75 0.63
B category 0.56 0.73 1.00 0.80
C category 0.56 0.67 0.88 0.73
D category 0.11 0.27 0.44 0.30
    n 40
Retail format
Hypermarket 0.36 0.50 0.75 0.54
Supermarket 0.79 0.83 0.88 0.83
Discount market 0.14 0.22 0.31 0.23
Cash & carry 0.00 0.11 0.25 0.13
Grocery 0.14 0.11 0.19 0.15
Bazaar 0.29 0.17 0.19 0.21
Gas station 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.06
Specialized 0.00 0.11 0.06 0.06
    n 48
Geographical market
International 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.10
National 0.07 0.17 0.56 0.27
Regional 0.47 0.17 0.31 0.31
Local 0.53 0.72 0.31 0.53
    n 49
Note: Colum totals exceed 1 because of multiple response.  
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Table 12. Determinants of product prices
Small Medium Large Total Small Medium Large Total
Input costs 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.9 3.0 2.8 2.9 2.9
Demand 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.0
Other retailers'/suppliers' prices 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.0 1.9 1.8 2.0
Level of stocks 2.4 2.2 2.0 2.2 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.9
Retailers' financial position 2.1 2.3 1.9 2.1
Payment conditions 2.4 2.6 2.2 2.4
"Private label" 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.5
    n 50 74





Table 13. Price flexing
Small Medium Large Total Small Medium Large Total
Price flexing 0.33 0.53 0.75 0.54 0.63 0.61 0.79 0.68
    n 50 74
Determinants of price flexing
Regional demand 0.80 0.50 0.33 0.48 0.33 0.43 0.80 0.48
Regional cost differentials 0.60 0.20 0.50 0.41 0.56 0.50 1.00 0.65
Other regional 
    retailers'/suppliers' prices 1.00 0.80 0.83 0.85 0.44 0.67 0.80 0.60
New stores 0.80 0.60 0.75 0.70
Entry by others 0.80 0.50 0.25 0.44 0.11 0.00 0.60 0.20
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Table 14. Near- and below-cost sales
Never Once a Once a Once a Always
year month week
Near- or below-cost selling by yourself
Small 0.27 0.00 0.27 0.40 0.07
Medium 0.29 0.07 0.43 0.14 0.07
Large 0.36 0.45 0.09 0.00 0.09
Total 0.30 0.15 0.28 0.20 0.08
    n 40
Near- or below-cost selling by other retailers
Small 0.08 0.08 0.31 0.15 0.38
Medium 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.24 0.24
Large 0.20 0.10 0.20 0.00 0.50
Total 0.08 0.05 0.38 0.15 0.35
    n 40
Suppliers' assessment
Small 0.43 0.35 0.22 0.00 0.00
Medium 0.54 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.00
Large 0.33 0.33 0.19 0.14 0.00
Total 0.36 0.29 0.23 0.06 0.06
    n 66  
 
 
Table 15. Assessment on below-cost sales
Small Medium Large Total
Used as a marketing method 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.52
Used to eliminate stocks 0.47 0.58 0.88 0.64
Used to force competitors to exit 0.33 0.32 0.19 0.28
Used to attract customers for other products 0.67 0.68 0.50 0.62
Cannot be used systematically 0.60 0.79 0.81 0.74
Harmul for suppliers 0.60 0.63 0.69 0.64
Makes markets more competitive 0.47 0.32 0.19 0.32
Causes unfair competition 0.93 0.89 0.81 0.88
    n 48
Small Medium Large Total
Used as a marketing method 0.30 0.39 0.32 0.33
Used to eliminate stocks 0.70 0.72 0.72 0.71
Used to force competitors to exit 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.33
Used to attract customers for other products 0.43 0.71 0.60 0.57
Cannot be used systematically 0.86 0.89 0.79 0.84
Harmul for suppliers 0.74 0.88 0.88 0.83
Makes markets more competitive 0.35 0.28 0.12 0.24
Causes unfair competition 0.83 0.89 0.96 0.89
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Table 16. Procurement and distribution channels
Number of Number of
suppliers producers distributors wholesalers retailers distributors wholesalers retailers
Small 178 0.20 0.60 0.19 10 0.47 0.23 0.30
Medium 400 0.27 0.52 0.21 10 0.44 0.29 0.28
Large 1250 0.60 0.31 0.09 28 0.66 0.14 0.20
Total 500 0.35 0.48 0.17 10 0.53 0.21 0.26
    n 51 50 60 78
Note: Number of suppliers and number of retailers are median values.
Retailers Suppliers




Table 17. Retailer-supplier relations
Small Medium Large Total Small Medium Large Total
Retailers' charges on suppliers for shelf space
Listing (entry) fee 2.2 2.1 1.9 2.1 3.1 2.6 3.1 3.0
Shelf fee 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.8
Slotting/position fee (gondola, palet, etc) 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.4 3.0 2.6 3.1 2.9
Promotion (insert) fee 2.6 3.0 2.6 2.7 3.1 2.7 3.2 3.0
    n 50 71
Supply conditions
Packing by suppliers 1.8 2.6 3.1 2.5 3.7 2.8 3.0 3.2
Returned items taken by suppliers 3.4 3.4 3.1 3.3 3.6 3.1 3.0 3.2
Exclusivity restrictions on suppliers 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.5
Prices set by suppliers 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.7 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.9
    n 50 71
Discounts by suppliers
Quantity purchased 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.1 2.4 2.4
Payment period 3.2 3.0 2.9 3.0 2.4 2.7 2.5 2.5
Retailers' promotions 2.7 2.4 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.4 2.4
Product range 2.5 2.8 2.5 2.6 2.1 1.8 2.0 2.0
Exclusivity agreement 2.2 2.5 2.0 2.2 1.9 1.8 2.1 1.9
Shelf area 2.2 2.3 1.8 2.1 1.4 1.4 1.9 1.6
    n 50 72





Table 18. Characteristics of private label products
Retail Supplier Production Marketing Quality
price price cost cost
Retailers' assessment
Small -0.58 -0.58 -0.25
Medium -0.64 -0.71 -0.21
Large -0.87 -1.00 -0.27
Total -0.71 -0.79 -0.24
    n 42
Suppliers' assessment
Small -0.59 -0.29 -0.53 -0.18
Medium -0.58 -0.17 -0.50 -0.25
Large -0.78 -0.35 -0.47 -0.35
Total -0.66 -0.28 -0.50 -0.26
    n 54
Index values: -1 lower/worse, 0 same, +1 higher/better  
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Table 19. Obstacles for retailers' growth
Small Medium Large Total
Tax rates 3.3 3.4 2.9 3.2
Land/store availability 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.0
Competition from informal firms 3.1 2.7 3.1 3.0
Competition from large chain stores 3.1 3.1 2.4 2.9
Regulation on opening new markets/shops 2.7 2.3 3.1 2.7
Macroeconomic uncertainty (exchange rate, inflation, etc.) 2.7 2.9 2.5 2.7
Costs of financing (interest rate, etc.) 2.3 2.7 2.0 2.4
Conditions on financing (collateral, etc.) 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.2
Transportation 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.2
Customs and trade regulations 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.9
Consumer demand 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.9
    n 48
Scale: 1 does not pose any problem, 2 partially important, 3 important, 4 the most important obstacle.  
 
 
Table 20. Determinants of retailers' competitiveness
Small Medium Large Total
Stores' location 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.0
Product quality 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9
Product range/diversity 2.9 2.8 3.0 2.9
Retailer's brand/reputation 2.8 2.8 3.0 2.9
Promotions 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.8
Proximity to consumers 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8
Price 2.5 3.0 2.8 2.8
Other services provided (parking, etc.) 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.7
Sales services (packing, etc.) 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.7
Stores' appearance (lighting, open area, etc.) 2.9 2.6 2.5 2.7
Product brand 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6
Loyalty card practices 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.2
    n 50
Scale: 1 does not important, 2 partially important, 3 very important  
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Table 21. Expected change in foreign firms' market share in the next decade
Small Medium Large Total
Foreign share will increase (% of retailers) 0.75 0.89 0.93 0.86
    n 50
Impact on
Retail prices -0.36 -0.12 -0.43 -0.29
Product diversity 1.00 0.76 0.93 0.88
Product quality 0.73 0.59 0.64 0.64
Employment 0.55 0.47 0.79 0.60
Production of domestic suppliers -0.09 -0.06 0.21 0.02
    n 42
Small Medium Large Total
Foreign share will increase (% of suppliers) 0.87 0.94 0.88 0.89
    n 72
Impact on
Retail prices -0.35 -0.13 -0.22 -0.24
Product diversity 1.00 0.94 0.91 0.95
Product quality 0.80 0.25 0.68 0.60
Employment 0.65 0.44 0.68 0.60
Production of domestic suppliers 0.55 0.37 0.32 0.41
    n 64
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Table 22. Assessment of the draft law on retail sector
Small Medium Large Total
A law regulating the retail sector 0.69 1.00 0.69 0.80
Restrictions on private label share (like 20%) 0.25 0.35 -0.25 0.12
Regulations on payment conditions 0.00 0.06 -0.19 -0.04
Restrictions on below-cost sales 0.62 0.84 0.50 0.67
Restrictions on exclusivity agreements 0.12 0.12 -0.13 0.04
Restrictions on promotions -0.31 -0.11 -0.75 -0.37
Regulations on work time (like Sunday holiday) 0.44 0.37 -0.06 0.25
Restrictions on hypermarket locations (outside
    residential areas) 0.06 0.11 -0.63 -0.14
Requiring permission to open new markets 0.75 0.32 -0.06 0.33
    n 50
Small Medium Large Total
A law regulating the retail sector 0.79 0.89 1.00 0.89
Restrictions on private label share (like 20%) 0.08 0.59 0.48 0.36
Regulations on payment conditions 0.78 0.89 0.72 0.79
Restrictions on below-cost sales 0.83 0.94 0.92 0.90
Restrictions on exclusivity agreements 0.47 0.41 0.41 0.43
Restrictions on promotions 0.08 0.39 -0.04 0.12
Regulations on work time (like Sunday holiday) -0.04 0.22 -0.13 0.00
Restrictions on hypermarket locations (outside
    residential areas) 0.37 0.50 0.44 0.43
Requiring permission to open new markets 0.37 0.67 0.52 0.51
    n 72
Index values: 1 in favor, 0 indifferent, -1 against.
Retailers
Suppliers
 
 
 
 